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Abstract
In 1979 following a decade of hyperinWation, Iceland introduced a form of long term lending known as Verðtryggð
lán, negatively amortised, index-linked loans whose outstanding principal is increased by the rate of the consumer
price inWation index(CPI). These loans subsequently became the primary form of long term lending within Iceland by
commercial banks and other institutions.
The loans were part of a general government policy which used indexation to the CPI to address the economic
consequences of the hyperinWation. This progressively linked increases in prices, wages and eventually loans directly
to the CPI. Although most other forms of indexation were subsequently removed, loan indexation has remained, and
these loans now comprise the majority of mortgages in Iceland. Although it is still often argued that index-linked
loans helped to stop the hyperinWation, these arguments are typically based on high level macro-economic interpre-
tations of the Icelandic economy, they fail the scientiVc test of providing speciVc mechanisms to support their claims.
In this paper we take the opposite approach, and present a detailed analysis of the monetary mechanics used for the
loans, and their eUect on the Icelandic economy, based on a complete model of their interaction within the banking
system at the fundamental level of all its transactions - the double entry bookkeeping level.
Based on this analysis there appears to be no evidence or mechanism that would support the claim that index-
linked loans reduce or stop inWation. Instead our research shows that the bookkeeping treatment of these loans within
the banking system directly contributes to the banking system’s monetary expansion rate, and hence index-linked
loans act to increase the inWation rate to which they are linked, rather than reducing it. They consequently create
a positive feedback loop within the banking system’s monetary regulation operating directly on the money supply.
Our results indicate that the additional monetary expansion caused by these loans has ranged between 4% to 12% per
anum over the past 20 years, and continuing excessive inWation can be expected until these loans are removed from
the economy. As a consequence borrowers with these loans will Vnd eventual repayment diXcult if not impossible.
Since the feedback into monetary expansion only occurs at annual CPI rates above approximately 2%, we suggest one
solution would be to stabilise the money supply to 0% growth, and we explore some ways this could be achieved by
modifying the Basel Regulatory Framework within the Icelandic Banking System.
Introduction
When macro-economic comparisons are made between countries, it is rarely the case that diUerences in the types of
lending, particularly long term lending, are discussed. There are signiVcant diUerences though. In the United States
mortgage lending is predominantly made at a Vxed rate for the duration of the loan, while in the United Kingdom
long term lending rates are linked to the Bank of England’s rate, and can vary during the loan1. In Iceland, as a re-
sult of of measures to combat a decade long hyperinWation that followed the collapse of the Bretton Wood’s accord
in the 1970’s, the majority of long term lending between 1979-2013 has used an unusual form of Vnancial instrument,
the index-linked loan or Verðtryggð lán. These are loans structured with a base Vxed interest rate, and an additional
component which directly links their outstanding principal to the Consumer Price InWation index (CPI)2.
Indexed linked loans were the predominant form of long term consumer and commercial lending in Iceland be-
tween 1980-2008 and are still available today, although they are now competing with variable and Vxed rate loans.
They are typically structured as 25 or 40 year loans, with a Vxed interest rate, and an additional component that in-
creases the outstanding principal of the loan based on the CPI. This latter is structured to negatively amortise over
the Vrst half of the loan. As is typical with negatively amortised loans, while the initial repayments are lower than
1Keynesian policy measures that operate directly on the centrally set interest rate consequently have far more immediate eUect in their coun-
try of origin, than in countries with Vxed rate regimes.
2See Appendix A for the calculation formula for these loans.
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comparable Vxed or variable rate loans, the total cost of the loan is considerably higher due to the growth of the out-
standing principal during the negatively amortised years of the loan.
Considerable confusion has surrounded the technical aspects of the loans, with particular respect to the calcula-
tion of the indexation component, and the associated indexation index which has been modiVed several times. Histor-
ical information on the interest and indexation rates applied to these loans has proved diXcult to Vnd, and we draw
the reader’s attention to the qualiVcation we must put on the sources used in this paper. In all cases where alterna-
tives exist, we have chosen the most conservative series - and consequently the examples given in this paper may be
under-estimates of the actual situation of the debt load imposed by these loans.
There has also been a long standing question on how these loans interact with the banking system, and in partic-
ular its regulatory controls over the money and loan supply. Although it is frequently claimed that they were a key
component of eUorts to control the hyperinWationary environment in Iceland[1], no speciVc mechanism has ever been
oUered to explain this interaction, and the empirical data does not support this claim. As shown in Figure 1, the peak
of hyperinWationary monetary expansion in Iceland occurred in 1983, 3 years after the loans were introduced, and the
sharp subsequent falls in the monetary expansion rate can be correlated directly with negotiated agreements to sus-
pend wage indexation. This claim is also contradicted by the renewed rates of high monetary expansion that were ex-
perienced in Iceland at the end of the 1990’s, which ultimately culminated in another hyperinWationary episode in the
years immediately preceding the 2007 collapse, despite the then dominance of these loans within the monetary sys-
tem. The second hyperinWationary period in 2005-7 also occurred despite the Central Bank’s adherence to economic
theories on banking system regulation and progressively raising interest rates to 18% to control the ’overheating’ of
the economy.
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Figure 1: Iceland M3 Money Supply 1965-2011 and percentage annual increase.3
The negative amortisation applied to the principal by the indexation on these loans results in its substantial growth
over the period of the loan, it also raises the question of whether these loans can inWuence the monetary expansion
rate of the banking system, and through that the inWation rate? The mechanical operation of the Banking System is
performed using double entry bookkeeping, and its rules require that a matching entry in the bank’s accounts must
be made to balance this principal increase. When a bank loan is issued the matching entry is the deposit created on
the bank’s ledger and added to the borrower’s account. While this creates money in the form of a bank deposit, the
banking system is in theory regulated so that the creation of bank deposit money by lending is matched by its re-
moval when loan principal is repaid. As indexation increases the principal of these loans, two critical questions must
be posed: what is the operation that accompanies the increase in the loan’s principal to maintain the balance of the
bank’s bookkeeping ledgers, and can this operation inWuence the money and credit supply originating from the bank?
Most macro-economic analysis of credit crises concentrates on high level statistics of the economy such as overall
borrowing levels, currency relationships and GDP based comparisons, and has a marked tendency to treat the bank-
ing system and its eUects on inWation through the money and loan supply that it controls as a black box. Even recent
analysis of the behaviour of these loans is notable for a distinct tendency to treat inWation as a force of nature, and
concentrates on indexation as an approach to deal with its consequences, rather than discussing the causes of inWa-
tion and in particular the underlying growth of the money supply. Both Mixa[2] and Finnbogadóttir[3] for example,
3The 1965-1980 hyperinWationary period is shown separately in the inset due to the graphing issues with the exponential rate of increase.
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stress indexation’s importance as a means of compensating for Iceland’s historically high inWation rates, without any
exploration of its causes.
In this paper we will take the opposite approach, and concentrate on the causes of the historically high rate of
growth in the Icelandic money supply, and the behaviour of the banking system that led to this growth. We will focus
on the mechanical causes of the regulatory issues encountered in the Icelandic banking system over the last 30 years,
and the general failure of modern banking regulatory frameworks in Iceland and elsewhere to control the monetary
expansion of the banking system. We will show that rather than preventing inWation, the index-linked loans con-
tribute to the underlying rate of monetary expansion at an amount that is a function of the rate of inWation, thereby
creating a positive feedback loop operating directly on the money supply.4
1 Verðtryggð lán - Index-linked Loans
1.1 History
The Icelandic Krona was Vrst established as an independent currency by the Money act of 1875, part of a series of
constitutional reforms in 1874 which began the process of establishing independence from Denmark. As a de facto
member of the Scandinavian Monetary Union[4], the exchange rate for an Icelandic Krona was set at the common ex-
change rate of 0.4032258g of Vne gold to one Krona5
The Gold Standard, which in one form or other was the dominant banking regulation from the 19th century un-
til the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1973, attempted to regulate the bank deposit expansion process by
creating a Vxed relationship between the price of gold and initially the amount of paper currency issued by individual
banks. As over time the central bank role became established, the regulatory relationship shifted to deposits owned
by the commercial banks which were required to be held at the central bank, and direct control over the physical cur-
rency was removed from the commercial banks.
Iceland declared independence from Denmark in 1944, following which it was a signatory member of the Bretton
Woods Vxed exchange system[5] until its breakup in 1973.6 There is some evidence that a tradition of centrally con-
trolled interest rates, rather than those determined by a free market process, may have been inherited from its period
as a colony. Under Danish rule a maximum interest rate of 4% on mortgages was set by law in 1855, this limit being
increased to 6% in 1890, and 8% on all interest rates from 1933. Formal separation of a central bank did not occur un-
til 1965, prior to that Landsbanki provided centralised facilities and in 1952 its interest rate was made the national
norm[1].
Iceland was a signatory member of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944, and participated in that regime until
its break up in 1973. While the earlier monetary history appears to be unavailable, high rates of monetary expansion
can be seen from the beginning of the central bank’s money supply series in 1965 as shown in Figure 1. By 1969, and
while still in the Bretton Wood’s Vxed exchange rate framework the M3 money supply was growing at an annual rate
above 20%. By 1973, the year of the Bretton Woods collapse, the annual rate of monetary expansion had reached 33%.
Iceland then experienced hyperinWationary rates of monetary expansion throughout the 1970’s, peaking in 1983 when
the money supply expanded by 83% in a single year. Understandably this long period of monetary instability has had
signiVcant repercussions for both the Icelandic economy, and the behaviour of its consumers and businesses.
During the 1960’s and 1970’s Iceland had a central bank reserve requirement on deposit liabilities of 20%. At the
beginning of the hyperinWationary period there does appear to have been an attempt to control the expansion by in-
creasing the reserve requirement, which was raised to 28% with an additional 2% special liquidity requirement. As
described in the Icelandic Central Bank’s 1981 Annual report7, this attempt failed:
"The monetary development in 1980 supported a theory saying that Wuctuations in the monetary creation
are entirely reWected in the bank’s liquidity since no absorbing instruments exist. The intended contrac-
tionary impact of reserve requirements has been wiped out by the rules of rediscounting"
The assumptions behind the theoretical description of the operation of reserve requirements presented in economic
textbooks ignore the practicalities involved in the day to day management of temporary imbalances that are created
4Positive feedback is a mathematical process within dynamic systems where the result of a repeated sequence of operations feeds back into the
inputs to the process, resulting in an increasingly larger output from the process over time, which is then re-introduced into the calculation as one
of the inputs.
5The Vneness of a previous metal refers to the ratio of the primary metal to any additives or impurities traditionally expressed as parts per
1,000. A Vne ounce of gold is a troy ounce of pure gold content in a gold bar.
6Data on the Icelandic Money supply since 1965 is available from Seðlabanki Ísland’s annual report, which is available online from the Central
Bank’s site www.cb.is from 1997 and from the Icelandic National Archives from 1965. The Central Bank provides three measures, M1, M2 and M3,
where M1 is deVned as demand deposits and Notes and Coins in circulation, M2 as M1 plus sight deposits, and M3 as M2 plus time deposits. In this
paper we use M3 as the measure for the total Icelandic money supply. Care has to be taken in international comparisons of M measures, since there
is as yet no commonly agreed deVnition, and many countries include forms of debt in their gross monetary measurements.
7Page 10.
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as money Wows between banks. Inter-bank lending and other methods such as rediscounting8 allow banks to man-
age their day to day reserve requirement, by lending excess reserves and borrowing to make up shortfalls, and this
also allows them to circumvent the full force of the reserve controls. This problem was also mentioned by Keynes in
1929[6]9 in a discussion on the eUects of the diUerent practices between the US Federal Reserve Banks, and the Bank
of England in managing the bank rate and rediscounting.
The immediate cause of the 1969-1988 hyperinWation10 appears to have been physical printing of money by the
Icelandic Government as a source of revenue. Although direct proof of this is hard to obtain, an International Mon-
etary Fund(IMF) review of the decade following the introduction of indexation by Cornelius[7] gives it as the cause,
and it is consistent with the subsequent behaviour of the monetary system. A 1998 working paper from the Icelandic
central bank by Andersen and Guðmundsson[8] alludes to seignorage11 as a cause but then suggests that this was a
relatively small contribution as a percentage of GDP (3%). This is a slightly disingenuous argument as it overlooks the
role of physical money in the regulatory control over the behaviour of the banking system. The amount of lending
and consequent bank deposit creation by commercial banks in gold standard regulatory regimes12 is partially reg-
ulated as a multiplier of their reserves at the central bank which can be increased by cash deposits. Increases in re-
serve holdings caused by physical printing can trigger a considerably greater expansion in the part of the money sup-
ply represented by deposits within the banking system, in the absence of any other regulatory controls on the bank-
ing system.13 As a consequence, attempts by Governments within fractional reserve banking regimes to proVt from
money printing necessarily fail, as the purchasing power of physical money introduced into the monetary system by
the government is rapidly reduced by the considerably larger expansion it creates in bank deposits. The resulting hy-
perinWation has however proved to be one of the most economically damaging forces in human history.
The Icelandic monetary authority’s response to the 1980’s hyperinWation as described by Jónsson[1] in Central
Bank Working Paper No. 5, was widespread indexation, linking prices and wages directly to the inWation rate. A side-
eUect of the hyperinWation was a short window of opportunity for those with long term loans taken out before the
hyperinWation began, whose loans were eUectively written oU by the extreme monetary expansion at the end of the
1970’s. Jónsson’s paper minimises attention to the precise causes of the hyperinWation, and concentrates on the in-
dexation of lending as a solution to the particular problem of preserving the value of loan capital. This solution was
the introduction of indexation on loans loans in 1979, with the value of loan capital being directly linked to the CPI
inWation rate.
In an environment where the money supply is doubling every two years and the consumer inWation rate is over
50% a year; where wages and prices are largely indexed to the inWation rate; it is entirely understandable that protec-
tion of loan capital should be seen as a priority. Moreover, as Jónsson points out, indexation of debt provided a critical
pressure on political eUorts to stop the hyperinWationary expansion as increases in wages due to indexation were then
matched by increases in borrowing costs, so a behavioural component can certainly be argued for. Unfortunately the
introduction of indexation on bank lending disregards several critical diUerences between bank loans, and other forms
of lending such as corporate and government bonds. In particular, it neglects to consider the role the banking system
itself plays in creating inWation, through the expansion of the money supply in the form of bank deposits. It also over-
looks the source of bank proVt, which is derived from the interest on the loans they make. Because bank lending relies
on the creation and destruction of money (as principal is repaid), while proVts are derived from the interest payments
on outstanding loans, banks are relatively immune to the eUects of any money supply expansion that they cause and
do not experience capital destruction in the way that other lenders do.
The hyperinWationary period continued throughout the 1980’s as various attempts were made to unwind the set
of mutual feedback relationships that had now been created between the money supply, lending, and indexation on
wages. The monetary expansion rate dropped noticeably in 1984 following the introduction in 1983 of a temporary
suspension of wage indexation[8], and was Vnally brought under control in 1990 when the national wage agreement
ended wage indexation with monetary growth falling sharply from 14.36% in 1991 to 3.77% in 1992.
Loan indexation remained however, on mortgages, some forms of commercial borrowing and student loans; and
some of its longer term consequences were becoming apparent. In its 1992 Annual Report the Central Bank reports
that:
"Third, the indexation of Vnancial assets as well as higher and positive interest rates have had the impact
that household debt has accumulated instead of being eroded through inWation."
Other consequences went unrecognised. The 1990’s were a period of low inWation, in Iceland and elsewhere, as the
impact of rapid technological developments in manufacturing substantially increased the supply of goods and ser-
8Borrowing based on an underlying asset which is itself a debt.
9Pages 234-243.
10DeVning hyperinWation somewhat arbitrarily as an annual monetary expansion greater than 20%.
11Strictly, the diUerence between the value of a monetary token, and the cost of its production. Used in Economics as a general term for the
government’s ability to use its privileged position to proVt from printing money.
12Under the current Basel regulatory framework, there is still a multiplier relationship, but it is signiVcantly throttled by the separate regulatory
controls on each individual bank’s capital reserve requirements.
13The relationship between physical cash, a bank asset, and the customer’s deposit at the bank, is statistically multiplexed within the banking
system.
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vices worldwide. Iceland experienced historically low rates of monetary expansion between 1994 to 1998 which co-
incided with changes to the banking regulatory framework. The new Bank of International Settlement (BIS) rules on
the treatment of equity capital, generally known as the Basel Accords[9], came into eUect in Iceland at the beginning
of 1993. They introduced a number of signiVcant changes to the regulatory framework as described in the Central
Bank’s 1992 report:
The BIS rules on equity capital came into eUect at the beginning of 1993. They are somewhat diUerent
from the rules that have applied in this country up to now, the main diUerence being twofold. One, the
amount of equity needed to cover loans diUers, depending on the type of collateral behind a loan. Thus,
no equity need stand behind a loan to the central government for example, compared with 8% equity
against loans to companies without a quality mortgage. Two the deVnition of equity ratio is widened to
some extent so that certain subordinated debt of banks may be counted as part of equity. Furthermore the
equity ratio is increased from 5% to 8% of capital which need not mean a substantial increase since the
percentage is calculated on a lower base than before.
The Basel Accords formalised a secondary control on the regulatory limits on bank lending, the capital reserve re-
quirement, and were primarily intended to control the exposure of banks to excessive loan defaults by regulating the
amount of risk they could be exposed to. They were not intended to directly regulate the bank deposit expansion pro-
cess, and that they do in fact exert an inWuence on it, is probably serendipitous. While the central bank reserves reg-
ulate the amount of lending that a bank can perform as a function of those deposits for which it is required to main-
tain a reserve14, the capital reserve requirement regulates the amount of lending that a bank can perform as a risk
weighted function of its capital base.
Over time the capital reserve requirement generally dominates in determining a bank’s lending limits. In the event
of a shortfall in their central bank reserves, Banks can borrow either from other banks or as a last resort from the cen-
tral bank. When problems arise due to pressure on clearing and reserve liquidity the central bank can generally be re-
lied on to intervene. As a consequence, the central bank reserve requirement is ineUective in limiting long term lend-
ing expansion, and this can be seen quite clearly in the Icelandic statistics where the monetary expansion during the
2000’s was accompanied by a sharp increase in the amount of inter-bank lending.
Banks can individually increase the size of their capital reserves from proVts, and so the capital requirements place
no absolute limits on money and loan expansion. By any standards the index-linked loans are also extremely prof-
itable for their issuers. They carry a guaranteed base rate which is calculated on a negatively amortised principal con-
trolled by indexation to the CPI. In addition personal debt in Iceland has historically been treated as full recourse, and
in practice cannot be discharged through bankruptcy. However the high proVtability of the loans depends entirely on
a positive inWation rate. As shown in Figure 8, for rates of inWation that are approximately 3% or less (it depends to
some extent on loan duration), the loans behave similarly to Vxed rate compound interest mortgages, and the negative
amortisation isn’t triggered. Had the banking system’s regulatory framework in Iceland succeeded in imposing an ab-
solute limit on deposit growth, these loans could not have caused an increase in the money supply and the consequent
inWation. In that regime, any increase in the bank deposit portion of the money supply caused by the negative amor-
tisation would have had to be oUset by a decrease in lending. In practice, the net eUect would have been stable house
prices, a stable or decreasing CPI, and the loans would have been no more expensive than their Vxed rate equivalents.
With no absolute limit on the amount banks can increase their capital holdings, except for their proVtability, this
did not occur. Instead, as banks recognised the additional income accrued from the negative amortisation of the index-
linked loans, they were able to use part of this income to increase their required capital holdings. This in turn allowed
them to increase the size of their loan book, resulting in an increase in the total amount of money represented by
bank deposits, and as a consequence, in additional inWation. Financial liberalisation in the late 1990’s only exacerbated
the problem by fuelling a credit boom in housing, which since the Icelandic CPI calculation includes a house price
component, further accelerated the monetary growth from these loans.
1.2 Detailed Description
Indexed linked loans are structured with two components: a base interest rate, and the indexation which is applied on
the principal. Originally the base rate was Vxed for the duration of the loan, but since 2004 loans have been available
with base rates that are Vxed for 5 years and then reviewed. There do not appear to be any contractual limits on how
this review will be performed.
Finding a reliable series of the base rate interest rate that has been used for these loans has been diXcult. Since
2001 a rate has been determined by the central bank15, however Vgures from some institutions are at variance with
14This varies considerably, for example in the USA only "Net transaction accounts" incur a reserve requirement. In Iceland currently reserve
requirements apply to all accounts with a maturity period of less than 2 years, as well as debt securities and money market instruments. Rules on
Minimum Reserve Requirements, 15/4/2008, http://www.cb.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=5850
15Act No. 38/2001 on interest and price indexation, Article 4: "In cases involving indexed claims, the interest rate shall be equal to the rate de-
cided by the Central Bank, having regard to the lowest rate of interest on new, general, indexed loans from credit institutions, and posted in accor-
dance with Article 10"
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this rate. Information on the base interest rate used for these loans in this paper is derived from the Statistics Iceland
weighted average interest rates series for the commercial banks, "Indexed securities Real interest, % per year avail-
able at www.statice.is". These have been cross checked with the Central Bank series from 2001.16 which provides
the base central bank rate set for these loans. They appear to be slightly lower than the rates used by the commercial
banks used, prior to privatisation in 2001, so these graphs may slightly underestimate actual payment levels. Figure 2
shows the base rate values for indexed-linked loans and non-indexed loans from the Central Bank’s statistics.
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5
10
15
20
25
Interest Rates
General interest on non-indexed loans
General interest on indexed loans
Ver trygg  Ln base interest rates
Figure 2: Central Bank base rates for lending 2001-2012
The indexation component is calculated from the CPI index using the Janus rule(see below), which is applied to
the outstanding principal of the loan. Calculation of the repayments on these loans over their lifetime depends on the
combination of these two data series. The most reliable source appears to be Statistics Iceland which provides several
indexation series17 most of which date from the 1990’s or later. Table 1 shows the three tables listed under ’Indices
for indexation from 1979’. Since the ’old credit term index’ series appears to be a continuation of the ’consumer price
Series
Credit Terms Index 1979-1995
Consumer price index for indexation 1995-2013
The old credit term index of Vnancial obligations 1995-2013
Table 1
index for indexation series’ and together they cover the entire period, these are the series used in this paper for calcu-
lations.
Given that the principal of these loans is indexed to inWation, it is interesting that the Central Bank also chose to
vary the base rate by signiVcant amounts over the 2001-2012 period, seemingly in response to increases in inWation
during that period and presumably guided by Keynesian theories. Perhaps more signiVcant, at least for the theories, is
the absence of any corresponding contraction in the expansion rate of the money supply during this period.
The indexation component, which is applied to the outstanding principal, is weighted across a 12 month period
using the Janus rule18, which applies past inWation and a future estimate of inWation to arrive at a weighted average.
The calculation is performed using this approach in order to mitigate the eUect of large short term Wuctuations in the
CPI, but the calculation of successive percentage changes in this way is not mathematically neutral: as a side eUect it
eUectively prevents the borrower from beneVting from short periods of deWation which would have triggered a cor-
responding decrease in loan principal.19 Longer periods of deWation can cause principal reductions, as can be seen in
Figures 4 and 5 following the 2008 crash.
Figure 3 shows the theoretical repayment proVle of the principal for sample loans with a 4% base rate, and the
median inWation rate for the 1980-2011 period of 5.4%20.
The repayment structure for the loans results in a varying period of negative amortisation, the length of which
depends on the duration of the loan and the rate of inWation during the loan. The loans are structured so that the
indexation component results in principal growth (negative amortisation) from the beginning of the loan. However
16Source spreadsheet Almvex.xls, available at: http://www.cb.is/statistics/interest-rates
17www.statice.is, Statistics section 8. Prices and consumption, Consumer price index, Indices for indexation from 1979.
18Jónsson[1] p14-15
19Mathematically, the application of successive percentage modiVcations is not commutative, so this treatment results in the indexed amount of
the loan growing slightly faster than it would have otherwise.
20Since the hyperinWationary period in the 1980’s distorts the average rate considerably, the median rather than the average is used for these
charts.
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(a) 25 year loan amortisation (b) 40 year loan amortisation
Figure 3: 25 and 40 year theoretical repayment proVles @ 4% Base and 5.4% median CPI
borrower repayments can theoretically overcome the negative amortisation during the Vrst part of the loan during
periods of very low inWation. Depending to some extent on the repayment point in the loan, the CPI must be below
approximately 3% for a 25 year loan and 1.5% for a 40 year loan. This behaviour can be seen very brieWy during the
1990’s when between 1994-1998 the average inWation rate was between 1.5-2.25%.
Figures 4 and 5 show a series of repayment proVles calculated from the indexation Vgures from Statistics Ice-
land21, extrapolated where necessary from the end of 2011 using the average indexation for 2011 (shown dashed). In
order to provide a basis of comparison for the loans that is relatively neutral to the underlying monetary expansion
and its eUect on the monetary unit of measurement, the base amount of the loan in the Vgures is 80% of the average
price for a house in Reykjavik during the year the loan was taken out.22. The monthly repayment for the mortgage is
shown in red, and the outstanding principal in black.
21Source: www.statice.is statistical series "Indices for indexation from 1979"
22The source for house prices is þjóðskrá Íslands (Registers Iceland http://www.skra.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=7850)
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Figure 4: Indexed Loan proVles for 25 year loans calculated on the basis of 80% of the average house price in Reyk-
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1.3 Interaction with Monetary Regulation
Increases in the consumer price inWation rate have two fundamental causes: either scarcity of the goods and services
in the index causing a rise in prices due to supply and demand factors, or expansion in the money supply. Conversely
excess supply will cause a drop in prices, as will a reduction in the quantity of money. This relationship follows di-
rectly from the quantity theory of money[10] which is one of the fundamental equations of Economics 23. Analysis
of price data must consequently be performed with some caution since for any given price movement there are two
possible causes, which without reference to the underlying money supply data it is impossible to untangle. This result
applies generally and includes relationships between currencies, which are a balance of export and import demands
and the relative expansion of the money supplies of the countries concerned. Iceland’s money supply has usually ex-
panded at considerably higher rates than those of its trading parties, consequently the foreign exchange Wuctuations
which are often cited as the direct cause of inWation in its banks’ annual reports are better regarded as a consequence
of money supply growth rather than its cause.
Money supply expansion can similarly arise from two diUerent sources. Banks as part of their normal operations
create money in the form of a bank deposit, when a loan is made. This money is then destroyed as loan principal is
repaid. Whether or not there is a net increase in the money supply depends on the regulation of this process such that
the rate of new lending is matched by the rate of repayment of the principal on existing loans across the entire bank-
ing system. Physical printing of money by the government, especially in the gold standard banking regimes that were
regulated by central bank reserves will also lead to rapid hyperinWation, since the additional physical money(which is
treated as an asset) can simultaneously trigger a multiplier expansion in bank deposits(a liability) by eUectively lifting
the reserve limits. In Basel regulatory frameworks this eUect is still present, but since lending is also constrained by
the capital limits its eUects are not so dramatic.
There appear to exist several problems in the current regulatory framework which relies on a combination of cen-
tral bank reserve regulation, and controls on the ratio of bank capital to their lending portfolio (see Mallett for speciVc
details[12]). Modern banking systems demonstrate a wide range of expansion rates ranging from 1.27 times in the last
decade in Germany, 2x in the USA, up to Russia whose money supply has increased by 20 times since its last revalua-
tion in 2000. Iceland’s expansion rate of 6.76x in the post bank privatisation period 1999-2008 is at the high end of the
range.
There are then certainly grounds for suspicion that index-linked loans may be causing systemic side eUects, and in
particular interacting with the money supply. Whether or not this is actually the case appears to depend critically on
the precise bookkeeping operations that are used by the banks to perform the indexation on the loans they retain on
their asset books.
1.4 Bookkeeping of Icelandic Indexed Linked Loans
Table 2: SimpliVed Bank Ledger Example
Central Bank Bank A
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Loans 10000 5000 Deposit A.C1
5000 Deposit A.C2
210 Reserves 210
210 Cash 790 1000 Capital
210 210 Total 11000 11000
Table 2 shows a simpliVed view of the asset and liability ledgers for a single bank, and their relationship with
those of the central bank. Under double entry bookkeeping, all operations on the ledgers must be performed as (credit,
debit) tuples. Each single action, depositing money for example, results in two matching transactions, as a result of
which the total amount of assets must always be equal to the total amount of liabilities. In this example we show
an initial state with two deposit accounts, a matching quantity of loans, capital holdings of 1000, and central bank
reserves (an asset) of 210 with a corresponding deposit (a liability from the central bank’s perspective) at the cen-
tral bank. The cash ’asset’ represents either physical cash, or asset accounts at other banks. We will assume that the
risk weighted multiplier of 50% for mortgages (Basel 2) applies, and so that bank is well within its capital limits for its
lending book.
It should be mentioned that the reality of bank operations diUers signiVcantly from the description commonly
found in Economic textbooks. Central bank reserves are not held back from customer’s deposit accounts as is often
implied, but are separate holdings, and are classiVed as a bank asset, and not as a liability as the customer’s deposit
23P ≈ M/Q where P is the aggregate price level, M is the money supply and Q is the quantity of monetary transactions performed with M. See
Mallett[11] for comments on the reason for the removal of V from this version of the equation
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accounts are.24 Historically writers in the early 20th Century such as Keynes[6] would distinguish customer deposits
as ’deposit money’ or similar, and there has been considerable debate about its precise status. Today with electronic
transfers being used for almost all monetary transactions in Iceland and elsewhere, it is the amount of money held in
bank deposits that is most critical for determining the price level, while the money classiVed as assets, either in the
form of physical cash or deposit accounts at other banks including the central bank, plays both a regulatory role, and
is also critical in providing liquidity for inter-bank clearing relationships.
Table 3: Loan to Bank’s own customer
Central Bank Bank A
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Loans 10500 5500 Deposit A.C1
5000 Deposit A.C2
210 Reserves 210
210 Cash 790 1000 Capital
210 210 Total 11500 11500
To illustrate with an example, Table 3 shows a bank loan being created to a customer at Bank A, with the accom-
panying double entry bookkeeping operations. In this example, Bank A makes a loan of 500 to its customer C1, the
resulting ledger changes are shown in blue. Besides the increase in its deposits and loans books, it also increases its
central bank reserve holdings to maintain its required regulatory position. As it was overcapitalised before the loan
was made, it remains within its Basel Capital limits. When the loan principal is repaid is is reduced, as is the deposit
account of the depositor making the repayment. When interest is paid on the loan there are no direct money supply
implications as is also sometimes believed: a debit is made to the customer’s account, and a credit to the bank’s in-
terest income account. Since both of these are classiVed as liabilities there is no net change to that side of the balance
sheet, and the transaction is money supply neutral.
Under double entry bookkeeping rules any change to a single ledger, such as loan assets, must be matched by a
corresponding debit or credit to another ledger, maintaining the fundamental accounting equation Assets = Equity+
Liabilities. Consequently when loan indexation causes the book value of a bank loan asset to increase, there must be
some form of matching operation to maintain the balance across the bank’s books, and it is in the handling of this
event where the possibility of potential interactions with the money supply arises. The impact of the index-linked
loans on the banking system depends fundamentally on this rather obscure bookkeeping question - what is the com-
pensating operation for the increase in the loan’s principal(an asset), caused by the combination of indexation and the
negative amortisation structure of these loans? There appear to be two alternatives.
One approach would be to use a contra-asset account. Contra-asset accounts are asset accounts with a credit bal-
ance, which eUectively act as oUsetting (negative) balances on assets.25 This would maintain the balance sheet identi-
ties and would not have any direct monetary impacts.
There is some evidence from Búnaðarbanki Íslands’ Annual Report in the early 1980’s that suggests this approach
may have been used earlier. Between 1981-1994 they show an Asset balance for accrued interest and indexation, (Áfall-
nir vextir og verðbætur). There is however no obvious correspondence between the growth in this item and the entry
for index-linked loans. Between 1984-5 for example, outstanding principal for index-linked loans grew from 752 mil-
lion ISK to 1,300 million ISK, whilst the growth in the accrued interest and indexation account was only 102 million
ISK, and the annual inWation rate was 34%.26
The bookkeeping which appears to have been used for these loans is shown in Tables 4 and 5.27 The matching bal-
ance for any increase in the loan principal due to indexation is Vrst credited to the liability non-cash, interest income
received account. At the end of the year, banks are allowed to recognise this account as income, subject to regula-
tory controls on loss provisions and allowances for loan defaults, and regulatory capital. When this occurs the money
credited to this account as a result of loan indexation is recognised as an expense or dividend payment and trans-
ferred to a deposit account. At this point it becomes money and can aUect the price level. The result is a feedback loop
operating on the money supply, as shown in Figure 6.
24Strictly, the central bank reserve requirement was a fraction of the physical cash deposited at the bank. The customer’s deposit account was
the liability entry reWecting this deposit. Bank loan’s were written as assets, with a matching deposit. The introduction of cheques and other forms
of direct transfer between customer accounts, eUectively introduced two forms of equivalent, but not identical money into the monetary system.
25In double entry bookkeeping the arithmetic operation of ’credit’ and ’debit’ within a balanced ledger system depend on the side of the ledger
they are being applied to, rather than their english meanings. Credits to an asset account will reduce the balance for example, while debits increase
it, and the opposite applies to liability accounts. The general rule is that all operations must consist of (credit, debit) tuples, and the individual As-
set/Liability classiVcation of ledgers is fundamentally determined by the need to ensure equality between the total of assets and liability ledgers
as these operations are performed. In bank accounting the classiVcation of asset and liability accounts is sometimes the opposite to that used by
non-banks: for example bank deposits are classiVed as liabilities, and loans to customers as assets.
26Búnaðaribanki was one of the three main banks in Iceland up until its merger with Kaupthing in 2003. Kaupthing was nationalised following
the 2007 crash, and is now known as Arion Bank.
27This description follows what was reported to us in discussions with Icelandic Auditors specialised in banking.
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Figure 6: Indexation -> CPI Feedback Loop
The following exert from Chapter VI of the Rules on the Vnancial statements of credit institutions No. 34 of 3
November 200328, also supports this treatment, where it details the reporting requirements for indexation. In particu-
lar:
ProVt and loss account item 1.2, "Interest on loans and advances etc.", shall comprise interest receivable,
indexation and commissions receivable, calculated on a time basis or by reference to the amount of the
claim, on Assets item 4, "Loans and advances", including credited discount on loans and advances
To illustrate these operations in more detail, Table 4 shows the result of an increase of 500 in the loan principal
at Bank A and the corresponding entry in the non-cash income liability ledger. Bank B is set at the initial condition
for comparison. Table 5 then shows the subsequent recognition of part of the amount as income and payment to the
deposit holder A.C1 as a bank expense as salary, dividend payment to shareholder, payment for services, etc. A small
amount would also need to be withheld to cover the increased Basel capital reserve required for the new loan value,
which is not shown in this example.
Table 4: Principal Growth of 500 and Credit to Non-Cash Income
Central Bank Bank A
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Loans 10500 5000 Deposit A.C1
5000 Deposit A.C2
500 Non-cash Income(Bank)
20 Reserves 20
40 Cash & Eq 980 1000 Capital
Total 11500 11500
Bank B
Loans 10000 5000 Deposit B.C3
5000 Deposit B.C4
20 Reserves 20
Cash & Eq 980 1000 Capital
40 40 Total 11000 11000
It is not known why the loans were structured to negatively amortise the indexation component, since it is not
strictly necessary. The negative amortisation is created by the application of an annuity factor to the repayment sched-
ule which decays over time, creating progressively higher capital repayments. The point at which the growth in the
repayment amount overcomes the negative amortisation also depends on the underlying growth in the principal - as
can be seen when comparing the hyperinWationary period with later loans. The negative amortisation of the loans
does make them initially signiVcantly less expensive than the alternative, and this may have been required to make
them appear aUordable. It is also not known if this bookkeeping treatment is unique to Iceland. Other countries, no-
tably Chile have attempted to use indexation to control high inWation (see Lefort[13] for a survey of the literature on
Chile’s experience); negatively amortized loans are also available in other countries, and played a part in the US sub-
prime collapse.
28http://en.fme.is/media/utgefid-efni/rules_834_2003.pdf (page 14)
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Table 5: Recognition and expense payment
Central Bank Bank A
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Loans 10500 5000 Deposit A.C1
5450 Deposit A.C2
20 Reserves 20 Non-cash Income(Bank)
40 Cash & Eq 980 1050 Capital
Total 11500 11500
Bank B
Loans 10000 5000 Deposit B.C3
5000 Deposit B.C4
20 Reserves 20
Cash & Eq 980 1000 Capital
40 40 Total 11000 11000
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
Analysis of how much additional inWation these loans cause is diXcult. As long as there is suXcient loan demand,
the current banking system will expand the money supply to whatever limit is otherwise imposed by the regulatory
framework it is operating under. Since the Basel framework imposes no absolute limits on total capital levels across
the banking system, and central bank reserve requirements are not applied to all accounts, the expansion rate seems
to primarily depend on the rate of increase of the capital reserve, which in turn depends directly on the proVtability of
the banks, and their individual lending decisions. A bank could choose not to expand their capital reserve if they felt
that the new lending being requested was too risky for example, although this doesn’t appear to have been a factor
in Icelandic banking decisions during the bubble period. The question is how much of the capital expansion can be
attributed to these loans, and how much would have occurred anyway? While we cannot put an absolute Vgure on
this, we can estimate upper and lower bounds.
For a very brief period between July 1993 and April 1995, the annual inWation rate in Iceland fell below 2%. This is
under the threshold for negative amortisation to occur on these loans, and so during this time there would have been
little or no monetary growth due to this factor. The eUect of this can be seen in Figure 4c, where principal growth
Watlines for 2 years, and then subsequently increases.
The annual M3 series from Seðlabanki Ísland’s shows a growth in M3 of 2.3% for 1994-95, so we can regard this
as an approximate lower bound on the expansion rate of the Icelandic banking system without the inWuence of the
growth in principal caused by indexation. Figure 7 shows the relative growth of the Icelandic CPI versus the M3 growth
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Figure 7: Iceland CPI vs M3 % change 1982-2011
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over the 1980-2012 period. If we exclude the hyperinWationary periods between 1967-1990, and 2005-829 we can see
that that the M3 expansion rate increased from 6.86% in 1996 to 14.97% in 2004. So we can place the upper bound on
monetary expansion due to these loans between 4.56% and 12.67%, bearing in mind that the precise amount of nega-
tive amortisation with the loans is a function of the inWation rate itself. Consequently there is a positive feedback loop
involved, illustrated in Figure 6. which implies that the rate of expansion is likely to increase over time.
To compare the additional cost of these loans Table 6 shows 25 and 40 year repayment totals for Icelandic versus
Vxed rate US loans at a range of interest rates. Besides the extra cost of the loans, Table 6 also illustrates a less obvi-
Amount Base Rate Indexed (1990) Fixed Rate Indexed (1990) Fixed Rate
25 Years 40 Years
20,000,000 4.0% 55,981,097 31,670,200 134,458,782 40,122,000
20,000,000 5.0% 62,000,204 35,075,400 155,131,850 46,290,800
20,000,000 7.0% 74,959,290 42,406,700 199,926,304 59,657,400
Table 6: Total cost of 40 year Indexed Linked and Fixed Rate loans
ous aspect of the loans, their proVle depends critically on when they were taken out. While it might be expected that
the loans would behave similarly whenever they were created, this is not the case. Borrowers in the 1980’s experi-
enced hyperinWationary increases in their loan principal, but their salaries were also indexed. In the 1990’s, a period
of relatively low monetary expansion occurred, at the same time as productivity greatly increased, with the result that
inWation was low, and the negative amortisation of the loans was minimised. In the 2000’s however, borrower’s expe-
rienced both high inWation and higher interest rates for the Vxed interest rates on the loans. While salaries generally
rose above the inWation rate during the early part of the decade, post-2008 salaries generally dropped signiVcantly.
This also helps to explain the disproportionate diUerence in the cost of the 25 versus the 40 year index-linked loans,
once the negative amortisation component is taken into account.
2 Conclusion
One of the striking problems of current banking system research is that there is relatively little focus on an integrated
view of the entire system’s behaviour. Consequently when reforms are proposed they typically address single issues
aUecting one part of the system, and not infrequently - as the index-linked loans illustrate only too well - create new
problems elsewhere. This paper should of course also be read in that context. A far deeper understanding of the larger
implications for monetary systems of indexation instruments is required than is currently available, and this is an area
requiring considerably more research.
This failure to identify an integrated understanding of banking system behaviour has long proved problematic
for policy makers. The indexed-linked loans were originally introduced with the objective of stabilising the Icelandic
banking system during a period of hyperinWation triggered by government money printing. That government print-
ing of money can cause hyperinWation is of course well known, but that one of the causes of this form of runaway
monetary expansion arises from interaction with the banking system’s regulatory controls is not. That indexing loans
would cause monetary expansion due to obscure details of the bookkeeping treatment used, is also not the most obvi-
ous of side eUects.
There are other objections that can be raised against the index-linked loans besides their inWationary inWuence
though. The formula used for their calculation are not readily available; their historical calculation also rests on time
series data on the applied indexation rate that is diXcult to locate; and it is has consequently proved extremely dif-
Vcult for borrowers to validate their payment schedule. Since changes are periodically made to how the indexation
is calculated their future behaviour is also impossible to predict, considerably complicating individual Vnancial plan-
ning. With the newer form of the loan that has been issued since 2005, the base interest rate can also be arbitrarily
adjusted by the lender after an initial period, and there appear to be no contractual limits on this.
The negative amortisation of the principal, which is responsible for the loan’s interaction with the CPI, also vio-
lates normal principles of prudential borrowing. Borrowers do not typically begin repaying capital until 15-20 years
into the loan, and they incur extraordinary debt loads as a direct consequence, especially with the 40 year loans. Un-
fortunately these loans have been the predominant form of lending in Iceland for over 30 years, and the long term
outlook is not known: in particular excepting loans which are repaid through property sale, what percentage of these
loans are ever successfully repaid?
The long term prognosis for recent borrowers in particular is grim. As shown in Figure 5, the combination of high
inWation before the crash, and the high base interest rates at the beginning of the 21st century will make it extremely
hard if not impossible for many borrowers to fully repay these loans, and while statistics on the proportion of 40 year
loans are not available, they are believed to be the majority of these loans. Icelandic policy since the crash has been
29This latter period featured the main Icelandic Banks developing several innovative approaches to Vnancing capital expansion, which are cur-
rently the subject of legal action.
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to attempt to protect vulnerable and lower income groups, and Stefán Ólafsson[14] has presented a detailed analysis
of household situation and policy responses showing the partial success of this. However, the various forms of re-
lief oUered have often penalised those who acted responsibly during the bubble - in 2008 for example borrowers were
allowed to apply for a revaluation of their loans to no more than 110% of the value of the house, eUectively penalis-
ing those who had substantial personal equity in their houses. Additional relief has also been provided through tax
deductible interest rate subsidies to a maximum of 900,000 ISK for married couples in 2012. As a consequence house
price levels have been largely maintained, but there has been considerable pressure on rental levels, leading to high
rents, and then to compensating increases in tax funded rental subsidies.
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Figure 8: Projected repayment on 40 year loans with 0% inWation.
A further complication lies in the ownership of the loans. Indexed linked loans were available from the Icelandic
Banks, and from the Housing Finance Fund(HFF)[15] which is a government owned provider of mortgage credit.
They were also securitized. A 2006 Report by Kaupthing Bank[16] showed ownership split between the Icelandic
Banks(20%), Mutual Funds(9%), private holdings(8%) foreign investors(46%) and the Icelandic Pension Funds(17%).
While within Iceland there are widespread calls for indexation to be removed from these loans, ownership by the
pension funds who are required to index link their pension payments, and in particular the high foreign ownership
considerably complicates any formal adjustments.
It should be emphasised that only index-linked loans directly owned by commercial banks or similar institutions
performing fractional reserve lending can contribute to money supply growth through the mechanisms described in
this paper. However all borrowers with these loans are aUected by the consequent growth in the money supply. Since
substantial quantities of these loans were securitized and sold abroad (the Glacier Bonds), all Icelanders are poten-
tially aUected by the resulting foreign exchange imbalances which are being temporarily managed through capital
controls. It seems entirely too probable that this will cause further feedback issues when the capital controls are lifted.
If loan indexation causes higher inWation, then currency outWows on these loans will increase, weakening the Krona
exchange rate, and further increasing inWation as the cost of imported goods rise - which then increases monetary ex-
pansion through the indexed loans, leading inexorably to higher inWation.
In addition borrowers are now faced with loan and money supply growth in the banking system originating from
the newly introduced Vxed rate loans which are not negatively amortized.30 While the Icelandic money supply con-
tracted by 10% in the immediate aftermath of the crash, it grew by 7% in 2011. New borrowers with these loans will
beneVt from the monetary expansion caused by the indexed-linked loans, as the resulting inWation reduces their debt
burden; just as it increases the debt burden for those with indexed-linked loans. Consequently it seems highly proba-
ble that over time those with indexed-linked loans who are unable to reVnance into Vxed rate loans, will be eUectively
trapped into eventual bankruptcy, as a rapid divergence in individual situations divides house owners with growing
debt from indexed-linked loans, from those with declining debt with the newer Vxed rate loans.
Somewhat ironically, given the original reasons for introducing the loans was monetary stability, there is a pos-
sible solution that would eUectively remove indexation from these loans, without the need for any formal loan mod-
iVcations. This is quite simply to stabilise the money supply to 0% growth, which could then be expected to similarly
stabilise the CPI. As shown in Figure 8, when the CPI is 3% or less, these loans behave identically to compound inter-
est Vxed rate loans, and the negative amortisation and consequent money supply interaction ceases.
This would also help to mitigate the pension fund exposure to these loans, as in a constant money economy with
low or negligible inWation their indexation requirement towards their pensioners is also resolved. They would also
beneVt from a considerably lower default rate on their loans than would otherwise be the case, resulting in lower cap-
ital losses. An economy with a constant money supply would also provide considerably clearer signals to its policy
30Since the crash loans with a Vxed interest rate for the Vrst 5 years, and varying subsequently have been introduced by the banks.
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makers through the price mechanisms, since the distortions caused by varying rates of monetary expansion would be
removed, and this would considerably aid the establishment of sound and prudent policy direction.
Achieving this goal would require adjustments to the regulatory banking framework, and a legal mandate estab-
lished to support it. Mechanically speaking there are several ways the problem could be approached. The simplest
would be to adjust the current Basel Regulatory framework to maintain a constant capital amount across the banking
system, while also creating a uniVed risk weighting for all types of lending, and in particular removing the 0% weight-
ing on lending to governments.
The larger economic eUects of monetary stability are not known, since this does not appear to have ever been
achieved during the fractional reserve banking era. We suspect that one side eUect would be that many of the eco-
nomic indicators that we are used to, steadily increasing prices, steadily increasing government debt, would look quite
diUerent with a constant money supply, since the distortion introduced by the change in the unit of measurement
for these statistics - money - would be removed. However not enough is known about any long term side-eUects this
might create for liquidity provisions within the banking system as money is transferred between banks. Central bank
inWation targets (typically 2%) arise from the observation that low but positive rates of inWation appear to be beneV-
cial - but the mechanisms causing this eUect are unknown, as is their general applicability. There would also be po-
tential competitive issues between banks, if mechanisms were not developed for banks to trade capital within the sys-
tem, but potential stability issues if they were. However it can be argued that these problems are also present in the
current system. A medium term policy of stabilisation using this approach, careful monitoring, and an accelerated re-
search program into longer term regulatory frameworks capable of providing monetary stability, in conjunction with
a deeper investigation into the macro-economic consequences of these loans would seem to be the safest approach,
given the current state of economic knowledge, to deal with these issues.
More problematic are the potential exchange repercussions if Iceland did achieve monetary stability, which is the
danger that improbable as it might sound, the Krona becomes a store of value. The general failure of modern banking
regulation to provide monetary stability has created a world of widely varying monetary expansion rates, and Ice-
land is not in a position to support signiVcant investment demand for its currency. Until these issues are addressed
on a worldwide basis, small countries with relatively stable currencies are placed in diXcult situations - as the recent
experience of Switzerland shows. This would present an interesting challenge to Iceland’s monetary authorities, and
restrictions on Krona ownership, or other mechanisms might need to be introduced to protect the Icelandic economy
if this eventuality arose.
There are other approaches that have been applied by countries with excessive mortgage debt, for example the
USA’s deliberate expansion of its money supply over the last 4 years. This approach is reliant both on the preponder-
ance of Vxed interest rate lending in its monetary system, and the unique position the US dollar currently occupies as
a global trading currency. As a solution it is not available to Iceland simply because of the pre-dominance of index-
linked loans in the monetary system.
It is unlikely that any single solution, even quantitative stability, is likely to be the only required measure in Ice-
land’s situation. The issues created by the indexed-linked loans are complex, and potentially very far reaching, given
their 40 year duration. Monetary policies must be developed that are based on a grounded understanding of the di-
rect causes of inWation, rather than simplistic attempts to address some of its symptoms within a complex and poorly
understand Vnancial environment. A co-ordinated systems based approach is required, and one that is tailored to the
unique circumstances that Iceland, and its citizens Vnds itself in, rather than reliant on economic policy originating
from very diUerent monetary systems.
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Appendix
Calculation of Indexed Linked Loans
There are two forms of Verðtryggð lan with slightly diUerent repayment proVles, Fixed Amortization and Fixed
payment. In both cases repayment is structured as an annuity, with the annuity factor partially determining the
capital repayment. As a consequence, for rates of inWation above 2-3% (depending on the duration of the loan),
repayments during the Vrst years of the loan may not cover principal repayment and the remained is negatively
amortized. This leads to considerable variation in the point at which principal repayment does begin, depending in
part on the duration of the loan, and on the prevailing rates of inWation during the loan.
Fixed Amortization(real terms)
For an N period loan with an initial principal of X0 and a Vxed rate interest rate component of r. InWation is measured
as the percentage change in the CPI, pit =
CPIt−CPIt−1
CPIt−1 .
Amortization in real terms: Art =
X0
N
Amortization in nominal terms: Ant = Art
CPIt
CPI0
=
X0
N
CPIt
CPI0
=
X0
N ∏ tj=1(1−pi j)
The per (end of) period Principal in real terms: X rt = X0 −
X0
N
t
= X0(1−
t
N
)
The per period Principal in nominal terms: Xnt = X0(1−
t
N
)∏ tj=1(1+pi j)
Interest payments in real terms (paid at end of period): Irt = rX
r
t−1
Interest payments in nominal terms (paid at end of period): Int = r(1+pit)Xnt−1
Total payments per period: Pt = Ant + Int
=
X0
N
t
∏
j=1
(1+pi j)+ r(1+pit)Xnt=1
=
X0
N
t
∏
j=1
(1+pi j)+ rXnt
Fixed payment (annuity in real terms)
With terms as above, the Vxed payment in real tems is derived from the standard equation of annuities:
Pr =
r
X0
(
1
1− 1
(1+r)N
)
Payment in nominal terms: Pnt = P
r
(
CPIt
CPI0
)
= Pr ∏ tj=1 (1+pi j)
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The breakdown of interest and capital payments is then calculated recursively:
Nominal Interest Payment: Int = r (0+pit)Xnt−1
Nominal amortization: Ant = Pnt − Int
Nominal principal: Xnt = (1+pit)Xnt−1 −Ant
As the CPI changes over time, the re-payment schedule is adjusted through re-calculation of the ’Vxed’ payment.
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